Abstract-We consider the problem of diffusing information in networks that contain malicious nodes. We assume that each normal node in the network has no knowledge of the network topology other than an upper bound on the number of malicious nodes in its neighborhood. We introduce a topological property known as r-robustness of a graph, and show that this property provides improved bounds on tolerating malicious behavior, in comparison to traditional concepts such as connectivity and minimum degree. We use this topological property to analyze the canonical problems of distributed consensus and broadcast, and provide sufficient conditions for these operations to succeed. Finally, we provide a construction for r-robust graphs and show that the common preferential-attachment model for scale-free networks produces a robust graph.
I. INTRODUCTION
A core question in the study of large networks (both natural and engineered) is: how do the actions initiated by a small subset of the population affect the global behavior of the network? For instance, the fields of sociology and epidemiology examine the spread of ideas, decisions and diseases through populations of people, based on the patterns of contact between the individuals in the population [1] , [2] , [3] . Similarly, the efficacy of engineered networks (such as communication networks, or multi-agent systems) is often predicated on their ability to disseminate information throughout the network [4] , [5] . In these cases, the broadcast operation is used as a building block for more complex functions, allowing certain nodes to inform all other nodes of pertinent information [4] . Another important operation is that of distributed consensus, where every node in the network has some information to share with the others, and the entire network must come to an agreement on an appropriate function of that information [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] .
The ability of a few individuals to affect the global behavior of the system is clearly a double-edged sword. When the network contains legitimate leaders or experts, it is beneficial to ensure that the innovations introduced by these small groups spread throughout the population. On the other hand, networks that facilitate diffusion are also vulnerable to disruptions by individuals that are not acting with the best interests of the society in mind. In engineering applications, these individuals could correspond to faulty or malicious nodes that do not follow preprogrammed strategies due to malfunctions or attacks, respectively. Thus, This material is based upon work supported in part by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, and by the Waterloo Institute for Complexity and Innovation.
The authors are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the University of Waterloo. E-mail for corresponding author: ssundara@uwaterloo.ca. a fundamental challenge is to identify network properties and diffusion dynamics that allow legitimate information to propagate throughout the network, while limiting the effects of illegitimate individuals and actions.
The problem of transmitting information over networks (and specifically, reaching consensus) in the presence of faulty or malicious nodes has been studied extensively over the past several decades (e.g., see [6] , [4] and the references therein). These previous works have shown that the connectivity of the network is a fundamental metric in analyzing its resilience to adversaries. Specifically, f malicious nodes can be overcome if and only if the connectivity of the network is at least 2f + 1 (under the wireless broadcast model of communication) [11] , [12] . However, these proposed methods require that all nodes have full knowledge of the network topology, along with the specific parameters of the algorithm applied by all other nodes.
The objective of this paper is to analyze information dissemination strategies in networks with adversaries when each normal node only has access to its neighbors' values, and does not know anything about the rest of the network (i.e., the topology, number of nodes, location and behavior of malicious nodes, etc.); it only knows that the total number of adversaries in its own neighborhood is bounded by some known quantity (i.e., the locally bounded fault model [13] ). We introduce a new topological property known as robustness, and show that this property is key to characterizing resilience to malicious nodes. For distributed consensus, our conditions provide separate sufficient and necessary conditions for all normal nodes to reach consensus while limiting the ability of locally-bounded malicious nodes to influence the final value. In the case of fault-tolerant broadcast, the robustness property is used to show that broadcast will succeed in certain networks that do not meet previously established conditions [13] .
II. SYSTEM MODEL Consider a network modeled by the directed graph G = {V, E}, where V = {1, ..., n} is the set of nodes and E ⊆ V × V is the set of edges in the network. An edge (j, i) ∈ E indicates that node i can be influenced by (or receive information from) node j. The set of neighbors of node i is defined as V i = {j | (j, i) ∈ E} and the degree of x i is denoted by deg i =|V i |.
Suppose that each node in the network starts out with some private information (an opinion, a vote, a measurement, etc.). We will model each piece of information as a real number, and denote node i's initial information as
Further suppose that the network is synchronous and at each time-step t ∈ Z ≥0 , each node updates its information based on its interactions with its neighbors. We will model these updates as
where f i (·) can be an arbitrary function (and perhaps different for each node, depending on its role in the network). We assume that each f i (·) is specified a priori for each node i in order to achieve some pre-specified global objective. However, we also allow for the possibility that certain nodes in the network do not follow their prescribed strategy. We will use the following definitions in this paper.
Definition 1: A node i is called normal if it applies f i (·) at every time-step t, and it is called malicious otherwise.
The sets of normal nodes and malicious nodes are denoted by N and M = V \ N , respectively. Note that in comparison to the Byzantine fault model introduced in the computer science literature [14] , the fault model considered here does not allow the malicious (or normal) nodes to transmit different values at each time step (i.e., every pair of nodes will receive the same values from their common neighbors at each time step). This assumption is natural in many network realizations (such as wireless networks), and the above definition allows the malicious nodes to behave in an arbitrary manner under this communication modality. However, we will show that many of the results in this paper also apply to the Byzantine fault model.
Clearly, there is no hope of achieving any objective if every node in the network is malicious. Instead, a common assumption in the literature on fault-tolerant distributed algorithms is that the total number of malicious nodes in the network is upper bounded by some number f [6] , [4] , [11] , i.e., the f -total malicious model. In large-scale networks, however, it may be the case that the total number of adversaries is quite large. To capture this, we will consider a locally bounded fault model, taken from [15] , [13] .
Definition 2 (f -local set): A set S ⊂ V is f -local if it contains at most f nodes in the neighborhood of the other nodes, i.e., |V i S| ≤ f , ∀i ∈ V \ S.
Definition 3 (f -local malicious model):
A set M of malicious nodes is f -locally bounded if it is a f -local set.
Note that the f -total malicious model can be regarded as a special case of the f -local malicious model. In the rest of the paper, we will focus on two specific algorithms, (i) distributed consensus, and (ii) broadcast, and derive topological conditions that guarantee resilience to locally bounded adversaries.
III. RESILIENT CONSENSUS WITH LOCALLY BOUNDED ADVERSARIES
The use of linear iterative strategies for facilitating distributed asymptotic consensus 1 has attracted significant attention in the control community (see [7] and references therein). In such strategies, at each time-step t ∈ Z ≥0 , each normal node updates its local value as
where w ij [t] is the weight assigned to node j's value by node i at time-step t. In the literature, it is typical to assume the following conditions for the weights.
Assumption 1: There exists a constant α ∈ (0, 1) such that
The lower bound on the weights is imposed to guarantee convergence; there are various examples of asymptotically vanishing weights for which consensus does not occur [16] . We now review some recent results on resilient consensus.
A. Previous Results on Resilient Consensus
In [11] , the authors provided a comprehensive analysis of linear iterative strategies in the presence of malicious nodes. They demonstrated that linear iterative strategies are able to achieve the minimum bound required to disseminate information reliably; specifically, when a network is 2f + 1 connected, f malicious nodes will be unable to prevent any node from calculating any function of the initial values (under the broadcast model of communication). Variations of this problem were studied in [12] , [17] . While these results require minimal connectivity, they also require each normal node to have full knowledge of the network topology, along with strong computational and storage capabilities.
In [14] , the authors introduced the Approximate Byzantine Consensus problem, in which the normal nodes are required to achieve approximate agreement 2 (i.e., they should converge to a relatively small convex hull contained in their initial values) in the presence of f -total Byzantine faults in finite time. To solve this problem in complete networks (where there is a direct connection between every pair of nodes), they proposed the following algorithm: each node disregards the largest and smallest f values received from its neighbors and updates its state to be the average of a carefully chosen subset of the remaining values. This algorithm was extended to be a family of algorithms, named the Mean-Subsequence-Reduced (MSR) algorithms, in [18] . Although the research on Approximate Byzantine Consensus for complete networks is mature, there are only a few papers that study this problem in general network topologies [19] .
The recent papers [20] , [21] propose a continuous-time variation of the MSR algorithms, named the Adversarial Robust Consensus Protocol (ARC-P), to solve asymptotic consensus under the f -total malicious model; the authors provide sufficient conditions for convergence in terms of graph metrics such as the in-degree and out-degree of nodes in the network.
In this paper, we will show that the traditional metrics (such as degree and connectivity) studied in previous works (such as [6] , [11] , [20] , [21] ) are no longer the key factors that determine the efficacy of algorithms that make purely local filtering decisions. Instead, we develop a novel topological condition for general networks, termed rrobustness, which we show to be much more fundamental in characterizing the behavior of algorithms such as MSR (including ARC-P) and fault-tolerant broadcast.
B. Description of the Algorithm
In order to limit the influence of any malicious nodes, each normal node disregards the most extreme values from its neighborhood at each time-step, and uses the remaining values in its linear update. More formally, we extend the MSR algorithm to be the 
where w ii [t] and w ij [t] satisfy Assumption 1. Remark 1: Note that the above algorithm also applies directly to time-varying networks, with the only difference being that V i is a function of t. Furthermore, note that the above algorithm essentially falls within the class of MSR algorithms, with the following generalizations. First, we allow arbitrary time-varying weights on the edges at each time-step. 3 Second, we allow a node to throw away fewer than 2f values if its own value falls within the extreme range, thereby allowing it to take full advantage of the available information.
We call the largest number of values that each node could throw away the parameter of the algorithm (it is equal to 2f in the above algorithm). Note that the set of nodes disregarded by node i can change over time, depending on their relative values. Thus, even if the network topology itself is fixed, the algorithm effectively mimics a time-varying network. In other words, one can view this as a consensus algorithm with state-dependent switching.
Remark 2: Consensus algorithms with state-dependent switching have drawn increased attention in recent years in the context of opinion dynamics [23] , [24] . However, these works typically assume that the underlying graph is complete, and that there exists a fixed threshold for adopting values, which might cause the agents to converge to different clusters for certain choices of initial states [24] . Most importantly, these previous works on state-dependent connectivity do not consider the presence of malicious nodes.
Note that the W-MSR algorithm is efficient, scalable and fully distributed. Furthermore, no node needs to know the network topology; the only requirement is that each normal node knows (or assumes) an upper bound of f for the number of malicious nodes in its neighborhood. Due to this simplicity, it is perhaps unreasonable to expect that this algorithm will be able to completely eliminate the effects of all malicious nodes. Instead, as in [20] , we will seek to ensure that the algorithm satisfies the following property. 
, and thus the result follows by virtue of the fact that these quantities are monotonic.
The task now is to provide conditions under which the normal nodes reach consensus, despite the (arbitrary) actions of the malicious nodes. Recall that when there are up to f malicious nodes in the entire network, and each normal node knows the entire network topology, a network connectivity of 2f + 1 is necessary and sufficient to overcome the malicious nodes [11] . The first question that comes to mind is thus: what does the connectivity of the network have to say about the ability of the algorithm to facilitate consensus? Unfortunately, the following result shows that the traditional metric of connectivity is not particularly useful on its own to analyze the performance of this algorithm.
Proposition 1:
There exists a network with connectivity κ = ⌊ n 2 ⌋ + f − 1 that cannot achieve asymptotic consensus using the W-MSR algorithm with parameter 2f .
Proof: We focus on the case where n is even, for simplicity. Construct an undirected graph as follows. Take two fully-connected graphs of n 2 nodes, and call these sets A and B. Number nodes in A and B as a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n
Next we will prove that the connectivity of this graph is n 2 + f − 1. Let C = {C A , C B } be a vertex cut, where C A = C ∩A and C B = C ∩B. Without loss of generality, assume that C A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a |CA| }; other ways of choosing C A are equivalent to this situation by renumbering the nodes. By the definition of a vertex cut, we know |C A | > f ; otherwise, each node in B \ C B still has at least one neighbor in A, and since A\C A and B\C B each induce fully-connected subgraphs, we see that the graph will be connected (contradicting the fact that C is a vertex cut). When f < |C A | < n 2 , the remaining nodes of A still have k = n 2 − |C A | + f − 1 neighbors in B, which implies we need to remove at least k nodes from B to disconnect the graph. When C A = A, since B is complete, we know |C B | = n 2 − 1. Thus the connectivity of this graph is
In this graph, assume that all nodes in A have initial value c 1 , and all nodes in B have initial value c 2 , where c 1 < c 2 . When any node a i applies the W-MSR algorithm, all of its f neighbors in B have the highest values in a i 's neighborhood, and thus they are all disregarded. Similarly, all of b i 's neighbors in A are disregarded as well. Thus, each node in each set only uses the values from its own set, and no node ever changes its value, which shows that consensus will never be reached in this network.
In the next section, we define a topological property that we term robustness, and show that this notion more readily characterizes the situations where the algorithm is f -local safe.
IV. ROBUST GRAPHS
Taking a closer look at the graph constructed in Proposition 1, we see that the reason for the failure of consensus in this case is that no node has enough neighbors in the opposite set; this causes each node to throw away all useful information from the opposite set, and prevents consensus. Based on this intuition, we define the following topological properties.
Definition 5 (r-reachable set): For a graph G and a subset S of nodes of G, we say S is an r-reachable set if ∃i ∈ S such that |V i \ S| ≥ r, where r ∈ Z ≥1 .
Definition 6 (r-robust graph):
A graph G is r-robust if for every pair of nonempty, disjoint subsets of V, at least one of the subsets is r-reachable, where r ∈ Z ≥1 .
We start with the following result.
Lemma 2:
For an r-robust graph G, let G ′ be the graph produced by removing up to k incoming edges of each node in G (k < r). Then G ′ is (r − k)-robust. Proof: First note that the minimum degree of an rrobust graph must be at least r; otherwise, if there is a node i with degree less than r, then by taking the two subsets {i} and V \ {i}, we see that neither subset would have a node with r neighbors outside. For any r-reachable set S ⊂ V, if we remove up to k incoming edges of each node i ∈ V, where k < r, then S is (r − k)-reachable. By the definition of robust graphs, the result follows.
A. Resilient Consensus using the W-MSR Algorithm
In this subsection, we will explore sufficient and necessary conditions for resilient consensus using the W-MSR algorithm. The following key result provides a condition on the network that will guarantee that the algorithm is f -local safe. The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in the Appendix.
Theorem 1: Under the f -local malicious model, the W-MSR algorithm with parameter 2f is f -local safe if the network G is (2f + 1)-robust.
The following result shows that the condition in the above theorem is tight.
Proposition 2: For every f > 0, there exists a 2f -robust network which fails to reach consensus using the W-MSR algorithm with parameter 2f .
Proof: We will prove the result by giving a construction of such a graph, visualized in Figure 1 . In Figure 1 , S 1 , S 2 and S 3 are all complete components with |S 1 | = 2f , |S 2 | = 4f and |S 3 | = 2f . Each node in S 1 connects to 2f nodes of S 2 and each node in S 3 connects to the other 2f nodes of S 2 , and all these connections are undirected. Node a has incoming edges from all nodes in S 1 and similarly node b has incoming edges from all nodes in S 3 . This is an example of a graph that arises from the construction that we derive in Section VI, where we show that such a graph will be 2f robust. We choose f nodes of S 1 and also f nodes of S 3 to be malicious; note that this constitutes an f -local set of malicious nodes. Then we assign node a with initial value m, node b with initial value M and the other normal nodes with initial values c, such that m < c < M . Malicious nodes in S 1 and S 3 will keep their values unchanged at m and M , respectively. We can see that, by using the W-MSR algorithm, the values of nodes a and b will never change and thus consensus can not be reached, completing the proof. While the above discussions have been for an underlying time-invariant network G, it is relatively straightforward (albeit notationally tedious) to extend the results to timevarying networks as follows.
} be a time-varying network with node set V and edge set at time-step t given by E[t]. Let {t k } be the set of time-steps when G[t] is (2f + 1)-robust. Under the f -local malicious model, the W-MSR algorithm with parameter 2f is f -local safe if |{t k }| = ∞ and |t k+1 − t k | ≤ c, ∀k, where c ∈ Z ≥1 is some constant.
The proof is similar to the proof for Theorem 1. Finally, the following result provides a necessary condition for the W-MSR algorithm to be f -local safe.
Theorem 2: Under the f -local malicious model, the necessary condition for the W-MSR algorithm with parameter 2f to be f -local safe is that the network G is (f + 1)-robust.
Proof: If the network is not (f + 1)-robust, there exist two disjoint subsets of nodes that are not (f + 1)-reachable, i.e., each node in these two sets would have at most f neighbors outside the set. If we assign the maximum and minimum values in the network to these two sets, respectively, the nodes in these sets would never use any values from outside their own sets. Thus, their values would remain unchanged, and consensus will not be reached.
Note that the derivations of Theorem 1, Corollary 1 and Theorem 2 did not rely on the fact that malicious nodes send the same value to all their neighbors. Thus, these results also apply to the f -local Byzantine model of adversaries.
V. BROADCASTING WITH LOCALLY BOUNDED ADVERSARIES
Having characterized the behavior of the consensus algorithm in terms of the r-robust property of graphs, we now turn our attention to another important objective in networks: broadcasting a single value throughout the network. We focus on the following problem, studied in [15] , [13] . Consider a time-invariant communication network G = {V, E}, with a specially designated source node s ∈ V. The source has a value x s [0] that it wishes to broadcast to every other node in the network. However, there may be various malicious nodes scattered throughout the network that wish to prevent certain nodes from obtaining the correct value of the source. The authors consider the set of malicious nodes to be f -locally bounded. To achieve broadcast (i.e., all normal nodes receive the source's message), [15] proposes the following so-called Certified Propagation Algorithm (CPA).
1) At time-step 0, the source broadcasts its value to all of its neighbors, and maintains its value for all subsequent time-steps. 2) At time-step 1, all normal neighbors of the source receive the source's value and broadcast it to all of their neighbors. The normal neighbors of the source maintain this value for all subsequent time-steps. 3) At each time-step t, if a normal node has received an identical value from f + 1 neighbors, then it accepts that value and broadcasts it to all of its neighbors. This normal node keeps this value for all subsequent timesteps. Due to the assumption of f -locally bounded malicious nodes, it is easy to see that a normal node will only ever accept a value if it is the actual value broadcast by the source. For CPA, the following result from [13] provides a sufficient condition for all normal nodes in the network to eventually accept the value broadcast by the source.
Theorem 3 ( [13] ): For a graph G = {V, E} and nodes v, s ∈ V, let X(v, s) denotes the number of nodes that are in v's neighborhood and are closer to s than v.
This is only a sufficient condition; we will now provide a different sufficient condition for CPA to succeed, in terms of the robust-graph property that we have defined. We will first introduce a variation of the concept of an r-robust graph.
Definition 7 (strongly r-robust graph): A graph G is strongly r-robust if for any nonempty subset S ⊆ V, either S is r-reachable or there exists a node i ∈ S such that V \ S ⊆ V i , where r ∈ Z ≥1 .
Note that the difference between a strongly r-robust graph and the standard r-robust graph is that the former requires every subset of nodes to be either r-reachable, or have a node that connects to every node outside the set, whereas the latter only requires that one of any two sets satisfies the property of being r-reachable. Any strongly r-robust graph is r-robust, but not vice versa.
Theorem 4: Under the f -local malicious model, CPA succeeds for any source if the network is strongly (2f + 1)-robust.
Proof: All normal neighbors of the source receive the message directly, and thus they all accept it. We will use contradiction to prove that all other nodes receive the broadcast message. Suppose that CPA fails to deliver the message to all normal nodes, and let S denote the set of all such normal nodes. By the definition of a strongly (2f + 1)-robust graph, we know that some node i in S must have 2f + 1 neighbors outside S or connects to all nodes outside. For the former situation, at most f of these nodes can be malicious, and all other nodes are normal nodes that have received the message and re-broadcasted it; for the latter, this node would directly connect to the source and thus get the message. In either case, this contradicts the assumption that node i fails to get the message.
Note that if the condition of either Theorem 3 or Theorem 4 is satisfied, CPA will also succeed under the f -local Byzantine model. Finally, the following proposition shows that CPA succeeds in certain networks which do not satisfy the condition proposed in Theorem 3.
Proposition 3: For some f , there exist graphs with X(G) ≤ 2f but that are strongly (2f + 1)-robust.
Proof: For f = 1, construct an undirected graph G as follows. Start with a complete graph of five nodes, denoted as 1, 2, . . . , 5. Add two nodes 6 and 7 and connect them to nodes 2, 3, 4 and 3, 4, 5 respectively. Finally, add a node 8 and connect it to nodes 3, 4, 6, 7. Taking node 1 as the source, it's easy to check that in the neighborhood of node 8, there are only two nodes that are closer to the source. Thus X(G) ≤ 2f , but the graph is strongly (2f + 1)-robust.
VI. CONSTRUCTING AN r-ROBUST GRAPH
Note that the concept of an r-robust graph requires that out of every possible pair of subsets of nodes, at least one of the subsets is r-reachable. Currently, we do not have a computationally efficient method to check whether this property holds for an arbitrary graph. In this section, however, we describe how to construct r-robust graphs, and show that our construction contains the preferentialattachment model of scale-free networks as a special case [25] .
Theorem 5: Let G = {V, E} be an r-robust graph. Then the graph G ′ = {{V, v new }, {E, E new }}, where v new is a new vertex added to G and E new is the edge set related to v new , is r-robust if deg vnew ≥ r.
Proof: When we take a pair of nonempty, disjoint subsets of nodes from G ′ , there are two cases. If one of the subsets contains only v new , then this subset is r-reachable (since v new has r neighbors in G ′ ). If both of the subsets contain nodes from the original graph G, then at least one of the two sets is r-reachable, because these two sets (minus v new ) exist in the original r-robust graph G, and thus one of the sets has a node that has at least r neighbors outside. Thus, G ′ is r-robust. To build an r-robust graph with n nodes (where n > r), we can start with an r-robust graph of order less than n (e.g., some complete graph), and continually add new nodes with incoming edges from at least r nodes in the existing graph. The theorem does not specify which existing nodes should be chosen as neighbors. A particularly interesting case is when the nodes are selected with a probability proportional to the number of edges that they already have; this is known as preferential-attachment, and leads to the formation of socalled scale-free networks [25] . This mechanism is cited as a plausible mechanism for the formation of many real-world complex networks, and thus our analysis indicates that these networks will also be resilient to locally-bounded malicious nodes (provided that r is sufficiently large when the network is forming).
VII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
We have studied the problem of disseminating information in networks that contain malicious nodes, and where each normal node has no knowledge of the global topology of the network. We showed that graph connectivity is not particularly useful in characterizing the behavior of a class of algorithms that relies on purely local filtering rules. We then introduced the notion of an r-robust graph, and showed that this concept allows us to provide conditions for achieving the objectives of distributed consensus and fault-tolerant broadcast, without requiring any knowledge of the graph topology on the part of the nodes in the network.
For distributed consensus, variations and extensions of the approach used in this paper have recently appeared in [26] (for the f -total model of malicious, but non-Byzantine, behavior), and in [27] (for the f -total model of Byzantine behavior). The sufficient and necessary conditions proposed in [27] for the MSR algorithms to achieve consensus also apply for the f -local Byzantine model; however, the proof of the necessary condition in [27] does not apply for the f -local malicious model (which is the scenario considered in this paper), and thus obtaining a single necessary and sufficient condition for consensus under this model is an open problem. It is also of interest to note that the notion of an rreachable set is similar to the notion of 'clusters', which are topological structures identified in [3] as being impediments to information cascades in networks. While the topic of information cascades is closely tied to the problems that we consider in this paper, the presence of malicious nodes in our setup significantly complicates the analysis. Nevertheless, a closer connection to the results in those works is the subject of ongoing research. Finally, it will be of interest to relate the r-robust property defined in this paper to other recent characterizations of network topologies that facilitate faulttolerant broadcast [28] .
in the combination is lower bounded by α. Since the largest value that node i will use at time-step t ǫ is M [t ǫ ], placing the largest possible weight on M [t ǫ ] produces
Note that this upper bound also applies to the updated value of any normal node that is not in X M (t ǫ , ǫ 0 ), because such a node will use its own value in its update. Similarly, if X m (t ǫ , ǫ 0 ) is (2f + 1)-reachable, there exists some normal node j ∈ X m (t ǫ , ǫ 0 ) that will satisfy x j [t ǫ +1] ≥ A m +αǫ 0 − (1 − α)ǫ. Again, any normal node that is not in X m (t ǫ , ǫ 0 ) will have the same lower bound. Define ǫ 1 = αǫ 0 − (1 − α)ǫ, and consider the sets X M (t ǫ + 1, ǫ 1 ) and X m (t ǫ + 1, ǫ 1 ). Since at least one of the sets X M (t ǫ , ǫ 0 ) and X m (t ǫ , ǫ 0 ) was (2f + 1)-reachable, it must be that either |X M (t ǫ + 1, ǫ 1 )| < |X M (t ǫ , ǫ 0 )| or |X m (t ǫ + 1, ǫ 1 )| < |X m (t ǫ , ǫ 0 )|, or both. Further note that ǫ 1 < ǫ 0 , and thus X M (t ǫ + 1, ǫ 1 ) and X m (t ǫ + 1, ǫ 1 ) are still disjoint. We can repeat this analysis for time-steps t ǫ +j, j ≥ 2, to define sets X M (t ǫ + j, ǫ j ) and X m (t ǫ + j, ǫ j ), where ǫ j is defined recursively as ǫ j = αǫ j−1 −(1−α)ǫ. Furthermore, at time-step t ǫ + j, either |X M (t ǫ + j, ǫ j )| < |X M (t ǫ + j − 1, ǫ j−1 )| or |X m (t ǫ +j, ǫ j )| < |X m (t ǫ +j −1, ǫ j−1 )|, or both. Since |X M (t ǫ , ǫ 0 )| + |X m (t ǫ , ǫ 0 )| ≤ N , there must be some time-step t ǫ +T (where T ≤ N ) where either X M (t ǫ +T, ǫ T ) or X m (t ǫ + T, ǫ T ) is empty. In the former case, all nodes in the network at time-step t ǫ +T have value less than A M −ǫ T , and in the latter case all nodes in the network at time-step t ǫ + T have value greater than A m + ǫ T . We will show that ǫ T > 0, which will contradict the fact that the largest value monotonically converges to A M (in the former case) or that the smallest value monotonically converges to A m (in the latter case). To do this, note that
If we choose ǫ < α N 1−α N ǫ 0 , we obtain ǫ T > 0, providing the desired contradiction. It must thus be the case that ǫ 0 = 0, proving that A M = A m .
